

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

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21 June 1975

JS # 206646-75  
Cry!

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Duckett  
Mr. Proctor  
[REDACTED]  
Mr. Zellmer  
[REDACTED]  
Col. Taylor

SUBJECT : Briefing on Strategic Estimates for the Senate  
Select Committee

1. As has been discussed at several Executive Committee meetings, the DCI has been asked to give the Senate Select Committee a briefing on National Intelligence Estimates and the process by which they are produced, using estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities (both offensive and defensive) as a particular, detailed example. Precisely when this briefing is to be given is still unclear, though late on Friday afternoon (20 June) it looked as if the briefing might have to be given next Wednesday (25 June). As of 1900 Friday, the Wednesday session appeared to be dead letter but the briefing needs to be prepared with all possible dispatch since it probably will have to be given within the next week to ten days and the actual advance notice of the precise time which we receive will be very short. The DCI does, of course, want this briefing to be first-rate and to give an exposition that is thorough, detailed, enlightening and convincing. He also wants it to be supported by appropriate, well-designed graphics which contribute to its overall impact.

2. The DCI is envisaging a four-part presentation with the final part being a statement by some senior consumer (Jan Lodai, if possible) of the value of our national intelligence product and the way in which it is used. Attached is a draft outline prepared jointly by Mr. Stoertz and [REDACTED]. It has been reviewed by the DCI, who considers it essentially what he wants though he does have a few suggestions (as noted). The nature of these suggestions is indicated by his marginal comments which he added in pen. (There are also other marginal comments made in pencil on the attached draft. These are [REDACTED] and though the pen/pencil differentiation may not be clear on the Xerox copy, the two handwritings are distinguishably different.)

3. The DCI has asked to me to get all interested and concerned parties together (i.e., the recipients of this memorandum) to go over this draft outline in detail. His purpose is to jell what we want to say and ought

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to cover so that the actual text can be written and the graphics prepared with dispatch. (Both the text and the graphics will also be checked with this memorandum's recipients before the briefing is considered final.)

4. Since there is much work to be done and the time is short, I would appreciate it if we could convene in my office at 1400 on Monday, 23 June, to discuss this outline. I will have my secretary get in touch with yours at opening of business on Monday to confirm this time or arrange another mutually convenient one if necessary. I realize that snap meetings may complicate your schedules, all of which are full, but it is important that we get together as soon as possible so that the work which needs to be done can be undertaken with maximum efficiency.

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George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

*HC:76*

Attachment:  
Draft Outline

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NIO # 7447-75

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|                    |
|--------------------|
| Executive Registry |
| 75-6910            |

20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Possible Senate Select Committee Staff Briefing

1. Attached is Howard Stoertz' and [redacted] first cut at the outline of a possible briefing for the Senate Select Committee staff on how National Estimates are produced and the problems involved in their production using strategic Estimates as a concrete example and employing three years -- 1964, 1970 and 1974 -- as illustrative concrete benchmarks.

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2. Howard leaves for Geneva tomorrow (21 June). If you have a chance during the latter part of the afternoon we would like to caucus with you so that we may jointly discuss his ideas while he is still in Washington. After we get jelled conceptually with you, we will circulate copies of this proposal to others -- Ed Proctor, Carl Duckett, etc., for their comments and reactions.

[redacted]

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George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

[redacted]

[redacted]

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| SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM  |                  |                        |                |
|--|------------------|------------------------|----------------|
|  | UNCLASSIFIED     | CONFIDENTIAL           | SECRET         |
| <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>   |                  |                        |                |
| TO   | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE                   | INITIALS       |
| 1  | Mr. Carver       |                        |                |
| 2  |                  |                        |                |
| 3  |                  |                        |                |
| 4  |                  |                        |                |
| 5  |                  |                        |                |
| 6  |                  |                        |                |
| ACTION   |                  | DIRECT REPLY           | PREPARE REPLY  |
| APPROVAL   |                  | DISPATCH               | RECOMMENDATION |
| COMMENT  |                  | FILE                   | RETURN         |
| CONCURRENCE  |                  | INFORMATION            | SIGNATURE      |
| <b>Remarks:</b>  |                  |                        |                |
| Attached is a detailed outline of part III of the briefing which was discussed last Saturday. I propose to obtain comments on the outline from those offices with equities in this matter (NIO/USSR, NIO/CF, DDI and DDS&T). After a go ahead from you and the Director, we will complete the briefing boards (vu-graphs) and prepare a full text of the briefing. |                  |                        |                |
|  |                  | RE TO RETURN TO SENDER |                |
|  |                  | ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.  | DATE           |
|  |                  | ANIO/SP                | 6/19/75        |
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Statement  
W. E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
before  
CIA Subcommittee  
of the  
House Select Committee on Intelligence  
June 12, 1975

Mr. Chairman:

Historically, nations have conducted but not talked about intelligence. Much of what they did may have been known by their adversaries and others, but a refusal to comment permitted the adversary an option as to how he replied. Official confirmation compelled him to strike out. This was perhaps most graphically illustrated in the U-2 incident over the Soviet Union in 1960. Khrushchev's memoirs recount his knowledge over several years of these flights, his exposure of our cover story, and his possession of our pilot. They also state that the official confirmation by our President of his personal responsibility for the operation forced Khrushchev to react sharply, since an intelligence incident had been raised to a confrontation between Chiefs of State.

The legislation, control and supervision of American intelligence established in the National Security Act of 1947 reflected this traditional approach. The legislation delegated decisions to the National Security Council, provided broad powers to conduct intelligence activities, and phrased functions in vague and general language. External supervision was sporadic and sympathetic, in tune with the consensus on foreign policy which marked the times.

Under this arrangement, mistakes were made by intelligence. Some operations went awry, and the Agency in some cases overstepped its proper bounds. I fully understand and support the Constitutional process that requires that these be investigated. The allegations made about CIA are serious and, if not resolved, could undermine the public confidence and support which are so necessary to any institution in our country. I must raise a cry of alarm, however, at the direction in which I see this process turning, as I fear that it can result in a dangerously erroneous image of American intelligence today and permanent and potentially fatal injury to its sources for tomorrow.

While CIA has made mistakes, they were few and far between. Scrutiny of the intensity aimed at CIA applied to almost any other American institution of its size and complexity would, I believe, find analagous missteps in a twenty-seven-year history. More importantly, CIA itself has recognized its errors and issued clear instructions to prevent such missteps in the future. In May of 1973, CIA collected from its employees their memories of questionable activities it might have conducted in years past. These were assembled and reported to the Chairmen of the CIA oversight committees, and a flat assurance was given by me that improper activities would not be conducted in the

future. This was reaffirmed during my confirmation hearing, where I made it clear that CIA would operate within the law, and a detailed set of instructions was issued by me in August 1973 correcting each and every one of the areas in which missteps were reported in the past.

The Vice President's Commission's summary of its findings on CIA's domestic activities is relevant in this context. I quote: "A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the Commission that the great majority of the CIA's domestic activities comply with its statutory authority. Nevertheless, over the 28 years of its history, the CIA has engaged in some activities that should be criticized and not permitted to happen again." The Commission noted that some of these activities were initiated or ordered by Presidents, some fall within a doubtful area, and some were plainly unlawful. It commented that "the Agency's own recent actions, undertaken for the most part in 1973 and 1974, have gone far to terminate the activities upon which this investigation has focused."

The subject of assassination has now come to dominate current public comment about CIA and has raised deep concern among many of our citizens. Mr. Chairman, the current policy is clear. In 1972, my predecessor issued a directive that

"no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel." In the set of directives I issued in August 1973, I stated that "CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed." As for proposals, plots or attempts involving CIA, or actions by independent elements with which CIA may have been in contact, it is more sensational than valuable to try to reconstruct the atmosphere, the policies and the perceived threats and responses within our government 10-20 years ago. Public exposure of such matters today does no service to the United States, past or future, since our policy now is explicit. To the extent these matters require investigation, I believe they should be conducted in executive session.

With respect to surveillance, improper files and other interference with the rights of American citizens, I refer you to my public testimony given to the Senate and House Appropriations committees in January and February of this year. These matters were also the specific subject of clear policy directives in August 1973 to ensure CIA's full compliance with the law. The Vice President's Commission's report on these matters, quoted above, summarizes well this subject, and should place it in proper proportion.

Am I objecting to further investigation, Mr. Chairman? No, I welcome it. It is essential that our citizens understand how intelligence has changed over the twenty-eight years since 1947. It is essential that the public appreciate that the United States has developed the finest intelligence service in the world. Our leadership, and in this I include the Congress, is served by knowledge of foreign affairs and developments which would have been inconceivable twenty-five years ago. On a daily basis, Congress and the executive are made aware of the exact strengths of the strategic forces arrayed against us. Thanks to our remarkable strides in the technology of intelligence and in the skill and experience of the analysts with access to such remarkable data, our judgments are informed, not shallow. We also benefit from the courage and dedication of the career intelligence personnel serving their country abroad, frequently at great risk and without hope or desire for public appreciation. Our intelligence is independent of departmental interests and policy preferences, but we have established a structure through which differing views can be surfaced rather than suppressed, and sharpened rather than fuzzed.

The result not only protects our country better, it enables our country to negotiate on a basis of knowledge rather than confront on a basis of fear. It enables us to resolve local disputes in the world rather than see them flare up and entwine great powers in dangerous contest. More than once, an intelligence assessment of a critical international situation has enabled our government discreetly to bring together quarreling parties and avoid an outbreak of conflict. CIA's officers have quietly assisted friends under pressure or threat in many countries to stand up to otherwise irresistible pressures without the clamor of official U. S. or military action. A real investigation of American intelligence must also encompass these aspects, whose continuation depends on secrecy and whose contributions to our country's interests must be assured.

Even with such an improved understanding of modern American intelligence, there is work to be done. Those ambiguous guidelines of 1947 need to be clarified in legislation and external as well as internal directives. The permissive external supervision of years ago must be replaced by regular and responsible review, as it has

grown in recent years. And, Mr. Chairman, it is patently clear that our intelligence must be better protected from irresponsible leaks and exposures if its essential quality, the confidence of the foreigners and Americans who work with us, is not to be withdrawn.

Most of all, Mr. Chairman, all of us Americans, intelligence professionals, elected officials, the fourth estate, and our citizens as a whole must insist on a sense of responsibility to our nation as we look at our intelligence structure. We intelligence professionals must be responsive to our constitutional and legal requirements, and I believe we are. These investigations must be comprehensive in their conception as well as their detail. And we must seek sober judgments about intelligence, not shrill sensation.

An adversary prosecution focused on missteps is appropriate for a court or for a prosecutor; it is not appropriate to achieve a comprehensive understanding of an institution as complex and important to our country as intelligence. Thus, I hope we can focus primarily on our country's needs for intelligence in the '70's and '80's, rather than its missteps in the '50's and '60's.

CIA/DIA JOINT ANALYSIS GROUP STUDIES 1963-1965

| <u>YEAR</u> | <u>JAG STUDY</u> | <u>TITLE</u>  |
|-------------|------------------|---|
| <u>1963</u> |                  |   |
|             | JAG 6-63         | Alternative 10 Year Projections of Soviet Military Forces                               |
|             | JAG 7-63         | Alternative 10 Year Projections of Soviet Military Posture<br>Working Paper No. 6       |
|             | JAG 8-63         | Alternative Soviet Space Programs 1962-1980<br>Working Paper No. 7                      |
| <u>1964</u> |                  |   |
|             | JAG 9-64         | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Postures (1962-1974)<br>Working Paper No. 8  |
|             | JAG 10-64        | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Postures (1962-1974)<br>Working Paper No. 9  |
|             | JAG 11-64        | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Postures (1962-1974)<br>Working Paper No. 10 |
|             | JAG 12-64        | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Postures (1962-1974)<br>Working Paper No. 11 |
|             | JAG 13-64        | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Forces (1965-1975)                           |
| <u>1965</u> |                  |   |
|             | JAG 14-65        | Alternative Projections of Soviet Military Forces (1967-1975)                           |

| <u>YEAR</u> | <u>ESTIMATE</u> | <u>TITLE</u>  |
|-------------|-----------------|---|
| <u>1964</u> | NIE 11-3-64     | Soviet Air and Missile Defense Capabilities thru Mid-1970 |
|             | NIE 11-8-64     | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
|             | M/H NIE 11-8-64 | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
| <u>1965</u> | NIE 11-3-65     | Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses                 |
|             | NIE 11-8-65     | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
| <u>1966</u> | NIE 11-3-66     | Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses                 |
|             | NIE 11-8-66     | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
|             | M/H NIE 11-8-66 | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
| <u>1967</u> | NIE 11-3-67     | Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses                 |
|             | NIE 11-8-67     | Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack                  |
| <u>1968</u> | NIE 11-3-68     | Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses                 |
|             | NIE 11-8-68     | Soviet Strategic Attack Forces                            |
| <u>1969</u> | NIE 11-3-69     | Soviet Strategic Defenses                                 |
|             | NIE 11-8-69     | Soviet Strategic Attack Forces                            |

| <u>YEAR</u> | <u>ESTIMATE</u> | <u>TITLE</u>   |
|-------------|-----------------|--|
| <u>1970</u> | NIE 11-8-70     | Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack                  |
| <u>1971</u> | NIE 11-3-71     | Soviet Strategic Defenses                                  |
|             | M/H NIE 11-3-71 | Soviet Strategic Defenses                                  |
|             | NIE 11-8-71     | Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack                  |
| <u>1972</u> | NIE 11-3-72     | Soviet Strategic Defenses                                  |
|             | NIE 11-8-72     | Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack                  |
| <u>1973</u> | M/H NIE 11-3-72 | Soviet Strategic Defenses                                  |
|             | NIE 11-8-73     | Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack                  |
| <u>1974</u> | NIE 11-3/8-74   | Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict<br>Thru - 1985 |

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## United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH  
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 27, 1975

Mr. William E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Colby:


In the field of foreign intelligence, the Senate Select Committee wishes to examine the following: (1) the quality and utility of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs); (2) the authority the DCI exercises over the entire intelligence community; and (3) how successfully the Foreign Intelligence agencies of the United States alert policy-makers of impending events, e.g., the Middle East War of 1973.

Attached to this letter is a memorandum briefly describing the issues which the Committee wishes to examine at this stage of its investigation, the additional documents which the Committee now requests, and a number of officials the Committee staff proposes to interview. The Committee would appreciate receiving these documents as soon as possible so that they would be available for review prior to discussions with the experts from within the agencies. In addition, the Committee would welcome your suggestions for additional documents or the names of other officials which might contribute to our understanding of these matters.

I am sending a copy of the attached memorandum to Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Schlesinger also.

On behalf of the Committee, I wish to thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

  
Frank Church  
Chairman

Attachment

May 21, 1975

SUBJECT: Foreign Intelligence Case Studies

The Select Committee wishes to study the following foreign intelligence issues:

I. The Utility and Quality of National Intelligence Estimates

In order to understand and evaluate the National Intelligence Estimate process, the Committee wishes to study how relevant the NIEs are to policymakers and how they are used; how the objectivity of the product is affected by foreign policy preferences of the individual intelligence agencies; how effective the final product is in reflecting divergent opinions; and how changes in the process initiated in 1973 have affected the quality, independent judgment, and utility of the NIEs.

To illustrate the NIE process, the Committee has chosen to focus on the estimates of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive systems since 1964. Among the basic issues raised during this period were the projected number of Soviet ABM and offensive missile launchers and the capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 triplet, the SA-5, the Backfire bomber, and Air Defense Systems.

II. DCI Authority over the Intelligence Community

The Committee would like to evaluate how well the DCI has been able to carry out his formal responsibilities of: (1) preparing a consolidated intelligence program budget; (2) establishing intelligence requirements;

(3) coordinating and evaluating all intelligence activities, and (4) eliminating inefficient activities.

To begin, the Committee wishes to look at how the DCI establishes intelligence requirements through the USIB; what role the DCI's Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) plays in the formation of the intelligence community budget; and how effective the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff is in coordinating and evaluating the intelligence activities of the community.

### III. Adequacy of the Foreign Intelligence Agencies Alerting Function

The Committee wishes to review the Foreign Intelligence Agencies record of alerting policymakers of sudden tactical changes in the world situation. In particular, the Committee would like to examine the circumstances of three recent cases in which the intelligence community apparently gave inadequate advance alert: (1) the outbreak of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; (2) the eruption of the 1974 Cyprus crisis; and (3) the detonation of India's nuclear device.

In order to carry out these reviews, the following documents are requested:

#### I. NIE Process

##### A. CIA Documents

1. The final estimates for years 1964-1974 on Soviet strategic offensive and defensive missile capabilities, NIE 11-8, NIE 11-3, and NIE 11-38, plus the Memoranda to Holders.
2. The terms of reference and all interagency working papers submitted as part of the strategic offensive and defensive missile estimate process for the years 1964, 1968-74.

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